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Nationalism and Foreign Policy
Discourse in Turkey Under the AKP
Rule: Geography, History and
National Identity
CENK SARACOĞLU* and ÖZHAN DEMIRKOL**
ABSTRACT The argument of this paper is that the new foreign policy orientation
of Turkey under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government is a
constitutive component of a new nationalist project, constructed and carried out
by the AKP over the last decade. The article expounds the ways in which the AKP
has reformulated the notions of nation, national history, homeland and national
interest and demonstrates the role foreign policy has played in this reformulation.
Our point of departure will be the patterns we have observed in the statements and
political practices of the AKP government and its officials, particularly the
incumbent minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, whose book, Strategic
Depth, presents a more systematic explanation of the major principles and
assertions of AKP nationalism and foreign policy. We will also argue that after the
Gezi protests in June 2013 this new conception of nation and nationalism has
faced with a deep crisis, which has also exacerbated the problem of pursuing an
ambitious foreign policy strategy in international arena.
Introduction
As Turkish politics have undergone a rapid transformation under the rule of the
AKP (Justice and Development Party) since 2002, an immensely rich literature
dealing with the ideological orientation of this party and its foreign policy has
arisen. Most of the scholarly articles written on this subject posit a qualitative
break in the AKP period with a traditional foreign policy assumed to be
overwhelmingly shaped by a Kemalist ideological framework.1 These works seek
to sketch out the main tenets of this new foreign policy—generally referred to as
the rise of ‘neo-Ottomanism’—and assess its possible outcomes in the context of
the rapidly changing dynamics of world politics. Nevertheless, while strongly
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1. Birgül Demirtaş, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments: An Interplay of Imperial Legacy,
Neoliberal Interests and Pragmatism’, in Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir and Simten Coşar (eds.), Silent Violence:
Neoliberalism, Islamist Politics and the AKP Years in Turkey (Ottowa: Red Quill, 2012), p. 214.
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emphasizing the transformative effect of this rupture with Kemalism on the
strategic thinking of dominant political actors, such works do not sufficiently
discuss the resonances of the AKP’s own nationalist vision within its new foreign
policy strategy.2 The argument of this paper is that the new foreign policy
orientation is a constitutive component of a new nationalist project, constructed
and carried out by the AKP over the last decade, and intricately related to the
party’s quest to build a new kind of nationalism and a new conception of the
nation.
The importance of foreign policy in building or consolidating a nationalist
project in domestic politics is not something unique to the AKP period in Turkey.
Throughout modern history, it has been commonplace for foreign policy to
contribute to the construction of national identity and to the perpetuation of
nationalism by addressing an ‘other’ or ‘outside’ against which the interests of
nations are to be protected.3 Foreign policy discourse in a country is generally
considered to be an extension of the state’s official ideology, which is more stable,
rigid and general compared to party ideologies which are more populist, pragmatic
and flexible. The significant degree of consonance between the AKP’s new
understanding of nationalism and the foreign policy discourse/practice presented
in the last 10 years suggests that the party’s conception of nationalism is now
becoming the new official ideology of the Turkish state.
The relationship between the AKP’s domestic, nationalist project and its so-
called neo-Ottomanist foreign policy at the international level is threefold. First of
all, the AKP’s nationalist position has functioned as the major ideational
framework and ideological justification for its new foreign policy orientation.
Secondly, this new foreign policy orientation and the concomitant foreign policy
discourse play a vital role in the formation and solidification of the AKP’s
nationalist-hegemonic project at home. Thirdly, and as a logical consequence of
these first two points, the ‘future’ of neo-Ottomanism at the international level is
not only contingent upon the course of inter-state relations and balances of power
in global politics but is also highly reliant on the success or failure of the
nationalist project at the domestic level. Such an intricate relationship between the
AKP’s nationalist project and its foreign policy implies that the AKP’s
international politics should also be subject to a sociological analysis, as its major
elements and possible trajectory have evidently become part of ideological and
political struggles in Turkish society. Asking whether Turkey could continue to
pursue its neo-Ottomanist foreign policy is, at a certain level of abstraction,
tantamount to asking whether the AKP’s new vision of nation and its newly
defined nationalism is able to achieve hegemony in Turkish society.
The argument of this paper is that this new conception of nationalism has
informed the AKP’s foreign policy discourse and practice, and that this policy
has functioned in turn as an ideological site where this new form of nationalism
has gained political appeal and substance. We will expound the ways in which the
2. For examples, see Hasret Dikici-Bilgin, ‘Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties: A
Comparative Study of AKP and Refah’, Turkish Studies, 9(3) (2008); Nicholas Danforth, ‘Ideology and
Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP’, Turkish Political Quarterly, 7(3) (2008);
Alexander Murinson, ‘The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle Eastern Studies, 42(6)
(2006); Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, ‘Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy’, Insight Turkey, 10(1) (2008).
3. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride
and Pain (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
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AKP has reformulated the notions of nation, national history, national homeland
and national interest and try to demonstrate the role foreign policy has played in
these reformulations. At this point we need to highlight that we do not simply
claim that the AKP’s conception of nation and nationalism is primarily produced
through its foreign policy discourse and that Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the minister of
foreign affairs, has been the sole architect of this nationalist orientation. This new
conception of nationalism has become an integral part of AKP’s political
discourse in the course of its struggle to construct and consolidate its ideological
hegemony in Turkey and to deal with certain ‘destabilizing’ longstanding
problems such as Kurdish question. AKP’s foreign policy vision and discourse has
become one of the important political domains where this nationalist outlook is
reproduced and substantiated. The reproduction and reinforcement of this
nationalism in foreign policy is particularly important, because, as stated above,
foreign policy discourse in a country represents state’s official ideology. In this
respect the intricate relationship between AKP’s own nationalist discourse and
foreign policy discourse point to the fact that the party’s struggle for hegemony
has progressed far enough to dominate the state discourse.
Accordingly in this paper, we will turn our attention specifically to those official
statements where we could see the linkage between AKP’s nationalist project and
its foreign policy. The excerpts used in this article are not some sporadic
statements or isolated expressions that were just found and selected to strengthen
the argument of this paper. Rather, they are some of the most demonstrative
examples of a coherent foreign policy orientation that AKP gradually built since it
came to power in 2002. In this respect the excerpts in this article are elaborated and
presented in relation to a general evaluation of the historically specific features of
AKP’s nationalism and its general foreign policy strategy.
As such, our point of departure will be the patterns we have observed in the
statements and political practices of the AKP government and its officials,
particularly the incumbent minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. We will
also pay a particular attention to Davutoğlu’s well-known book, Strategic Depth,
which presents a more systematic explanation of the major principles and
assertions of AKP nationalism and foreign policy.4 Although it was written just
one year before AKP came to power, Strategic Depth the ideas in this work have
been used as a major reference point for the construction of AKP foreign policy
discourse.5 Strategic Depth has provided AKP officials including Tayyip Erdoğan
himself with ideas and metaphors for use in daily domestic political language as
well. Davutoğlu’s books and statements, in other words, have functioned as one of
ideological reservoirs through which the AKP officials have enriched their own
nationalist discourse in domestic political struggles.
AKP’s Conception of Nationalism
Since the AKP came to power after the 2002 elections in Turkey, scholarly
publications dealing with its political and ideological orientation have generally
focused on the party’s relationship with Islamism. This was quite reasonable
4. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
5. Aras, Bülent, and Aylin Görener, ‘National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational
Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East’, Journal of Balkan and
Near Eastern Studies, 12(1) (2010), p. 81.
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during the early period of its rule, as the party was founded by some leading
Islamist political figures who had dissociated themselves from the RP (Welfare
Party), the main Islamist political actor in Turkey to 1998. Such articles tended to
discuss whether the AKP could be conceived as a mere continuation of the Islamist
politics of the RP in a new guise or whether it represented discontent and hence
rupture with traditional Islamist politics that were doomed to become obsolete in
the face of the current forces and requirements of globalization.6 Another
mainstream discussion concerned the AKP’s relationship with conservatism and
liberalism in both the political and economic senses because, at least in the early
years of its rule, the party accelerated the EU-led reform process on the one hand,
and adhered strictly to neoliberalism in its economic perspective and practice on
the other.7 The final reason that the nationalism of the AKP was downplayed is a
pervasive intellectual tendency to presuppose an internal and necessary
relationship between Kemalism and nationalism, as though the latter could not
exist independently of the former in the realm of ideologies in Turkey.8 As the
overlapping arguments around ‘liberalism’ and ‘Islamism’ have dominated
discussion in the literature, the AKP’s relationship with nationalism and its
nationalist character have remained relatively neglected, being the subject of only
a few studies.9
Nationalism, when organized as an ideology of state, configures the ‘moral’ and
political bonds between citizens and the state, and thereby manufactures the
consent or compliance of citizens to the existing social establishment and political
rule—a process which is referred to as hegemony in Gramscian sense.10 The core
and common ideational elements that constitute the backbone of hegemonic
strategies based on nationalism are the notions of nation, national history and a
conception of common/collective national interest.11 Nationalism, at the most
general level, presupposes the historical presence of a particular nation, whose
members share some common interests (national interest) that are to be prioritized
over any other individual or sectarian interests. Nationalism emerges as a political
discourse and position in a society when political actors combine these ideational
6. Metin Heper and Şule Toktaş, ‘Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’, The Muslim World, 93(2) (2003); Menderes Çınar and Burhanettin Duran, ‘The Specific
Evolution of Contemporary Political Islam in Turkey and Its ‘Difference’, in Ümit Cizre (ed.), Secular and
Islamic Politics in Turkey (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Murat Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and
Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy’, Third World
Quarterly, 28(7) (2007); Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or
restitution of the Right-of-Center predominant Party?’, Turkish Studies, 11(1) (2010).
7. Erhan Doğan, ‘The Historical and Discoursive Roots of the Justice and Development Party’s EU Stance’,
Turkish Studies, 6(3) (2005); Ziya Öniş, ‘Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and
Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey’, Mediterranean Politics, 14(1)
(2009); William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey (London and New
York: Routledge, 2010).
8. See Yasin Aktay, ‘Politics at Home Politics in the World: The Return of the Political in Turkish Foreign
Policy’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 21(1) (2010).
9. Cenk Saracoğlu, ‘Islami Muhafazakar Milliyetciliğin Millet Tasarımı: AKP Döneminde Kürt Politikası’,
Praksis, 26 (2011); Simten Coşar, ‘Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam in the Construction of Political Party
Identities’, in Ayşe Kadıoğlu and Fuat Keyman (eds.), Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in
Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011); Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013).
10. Ana Maria Alonso, ‘The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism and Ethnicity’,
Annual Review of Anthropology, 23 (1994), pp. 389–390.
11. Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology’, Political Studies, XLVI (1998), pp. 751–765;
Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 188.
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elements in their discourse and practice so as to offer, defend and ‘hegemonize’ a
normative political/social project.12
However, the ‘concrete content’ of nationalisms can vary in accordance with
the different ways in which these elements are discursively defined. The idea of
the nation occupies central place and possesses an over-determining effect on
other elements since, as Alan Finlayson states, ‘the nation represents a naturalized
sphere, a level at which certain values, habits and customs are taken for granted’.
For Finlayson, ‘The discourse of national identity may be conceptualized as a
matrix, a background against which certain things may be considered, a setting
into which a people that considers itself a national people constructs and carries
out political projects’.13
As opposed to the way it is conventionally portrayed in the literature,
nationalism, formulated as such, is at the very centre of the ideological orientation
of the AKP and a critical and integral element of its hegemonic strategy.
Nationalism is here understood as an ideological instrument of political
hegemony, that is, an attempt to win the consent of, ‘interpellate’, and, when
necessary, mobilize large sections of society for a particular political project.14
The AKP’s foreign policy can thus be seen as one of the aspects or ‘moments’ of
hegemonic struggle in Turkish society, and its possible trajectory can only be
accurately predicted if this domestic dimension is adequately acknowledged.15
Nationalism provides the AKP with discursive and symbolic instruments with
which to constitute durable ideological ties between the party, the state and society
when justifying its neoliberal economic policies and defending and formulating its
foreign policy discourse and practice. Therefore, the party’s understanding of
nationalism and its symbols and ideas are not only a state discourse or rhetoric of
party cadres but are also embraced and reproduced in social relations.16
The AKP’s ideological orientation possesses the aforementioned definitive
features of nationalism: primarily, it envisions a ‘nation’—a homogenous political
entity with the members sharing some common characteristics; it also presumes
that the members of the nation share a common past; and it assumes a set of
common national interests that concerns and cuts across every member of the
nation and transcends ‘individual’ and sectarian interests. Nevertheless, the AKP
also represents a distinct and, in some respects, a novel form of nationalism in
Turkish political history. The ways in which this party has formulated and
constructed the conceptions of ‘nation,’ ‘national history’ and ‘national interests’
has differed qualitatively from Kemalist nationalism, which had largely
dominated the official ideology of the Turkish state until the AKP consolidated
its power as a government party. Thus, what Elias Canneti states in his Crowds and
Power for different forms of nationalism also holds true for the difference between
Kemalist and AKP nationalisms:
12. Umut Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), p. 33.
13. Alan Finlayson, ‘Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 3(1) (1998), p. 102.
14. Alan Finlayson, ‘Nationalism as Ideological Interpellation: The Case of Ulster Royalism’, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 19(1) (1996).
15. Faruk Yalvac, ‘Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the
World System’, International Relations, 26(2) (2012).
16. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, p. 3.
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It must not be assumed that all these national ideologies have the same content. It is only
in their importunate appetite and the claims they make that they are alike. They want the
same thing but in themselves they are different . . . people overlook the fact that the
concrete contents of these national claims, the real ideologies behind them, are very
different from one another.17
The AKP’s Conception of the Nation
Nationalism is an ideological instrument of building hegemony in a social
formation; but at the same time it is a ‘subject’ or site of hegemonic struggles in
the sense that different social forces struggle to represent nationalism and
articulate it to their political projects. This struggle also involves attempts to define
the nation in a particular way and to determine who is included in or excluded
from its scope. This is why in certain social formations ‘competing and even
contradictory notions of the nation may well exist side by side’.18 This was also
the case with post-Soviet Russian nationalism in the early 1990s. In the process of
remaking of Russian state in the 1990s, Russian nationalism became an
ideological site where different social and political forces indulged in a fierce
struggle to define the scope of Russian nation and homeland. The contentions
between Eurasian Russian nationalism, Slavic-oriented Russian nationalism and
the nationalist vision centred on the Russian federation in the early 1990s testifies
to the fact that the conception of nation could be subject to political controversy
and struggle especially in the wake of large-scale and rapid political
transformations.19 This holds also true for Turkey which has been witnessing
since the AKP’s rise to power a startling struggle revolving around how to define
‘nation’.
The historical specificity of AKP’s nationalism lies in its ideological
endeavours to build a conception of the nation that challenges the premises of
Kemalist nationalism. This explains the rise of the AKP’s distinct conception of
nationalism as a part of an ideological struggle aiming to dispossess Kemalist
nationalism of the notion of the nation and redefine it in a way better suited to its
own political project. This does not mean that the AKP’s nation does not share any
common symbolic and discursive elements with Kemalist nationalism; but these
elements acquire a qualitatively different meaning with different concrete contents
as they become a part of the new ideological framework.
The most striking and significant change in AKP’s conception of nationalism is
the role attributed to Muslimhood in determining the identity and the scope of
nation. It is true that religion had been an important element of Kemalist
nationalism as well. In the early Republican period, the nation-building process
and the construction of Turkishness went hand in hand as the national identity was
defined along the relatively secular lines of the marker of ‘Turk.’ Nevertheless, the
‘scope’ of Turkishness—the criterion for belonging to the Turkish nation—was
primarily determined by religion since the idea of Turkishness was perceived and
built as an instrument to gradually assimilate the ethnically non-Turkish Muslim
peoples in Anatolia into one ‘nation.’ While Islam did not define what it meant to
17. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 197.
18. Finlayson, ‘Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism’, p. 113.
19. Vera Tolz, ‘Conflicting Homeland Myths and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia’, Slavic
Review, 57 (2) (1998), pp. 267–294.
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be a Turk itself, Muslimhood as a cultural marker of Turkishness was, besides
language and willingness to adopt Turkish identity, one of the determinants which
would be included in the category of nation.20 Despite the precariousness of and
occasional shifts in the official or social definitions of Turkishness, its role in
addressing and absorbing the ‘Muslims’ of Anatolia has remained intact.
In the AKP period, not only has the relative weight of Muslimhood in the
‘concrete content’ of the nation increased but the nature of its role has also
undergone a dramatic change. In AKP’s nationalism, Sunni-Muslim values are no
longer conceived solely as one of the common cultural features of ‘Turkishness’
itself, but have become the core element defining what the ‘nation’ is.21 In other
words, Islam is no longer a cultural component of Turkishness, but has rather
become an independent identity in itself, and is no longer necessarily derived from
or instrumentalized for the idea of Turkishness.
Yet the AKP’s approach is not the only example of non-Kemalist nationalist
political currents attempting to reformulate the relationship between Turkish-
ness and Muslimhood in Turkish political history. The ‘Turkish-Islamic
synthesis,’ for example, was embraced as the state ideology in the aftermath of
1980 coup.22 Originally formulated in the early 1970s by a network of
nationalist and Islamist intellectuals called the ‘Intellectuals’ Hearths’ (Aydınlar
Ocağı), the Turkish-Islamic synthesis sought to demonstrate the perfect
compatibility of Islam and Turkishness and thereby assert the centrality of both
as an essential element of Turkish national identity.23 The qualitative and the
critical difference between AKP’s nationalism and the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis is that the main claim of the latter was that Turkishness and Islam
cannot be listed in order of priority and cannot be treated as separate identities.24
As the word ‘synthesis’ itself suggests, their major goal was to strengthen the
symbolic power and popular appeal of ‘Turkishness’ by blending it with Islamic
values. This is not the case for AKP’s nationalism, however, since, as stated
above, this party conceives Islam and Muslimhood as the core and integral
element of the national identity, which is not necessarily synthesized or
combined with the idea of Turkishness.
One could also question, at this point, the extent to which AKP’s nationalism is
different from the ideological position of the ‘National View’ (Milli Görüş) of the
preceding Islamist political tradition—represented by the MSP (National
Salvation Party) (1970s), RP (1990s) and SP (Felicity Party) (2000s)—from
which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the leading cadres of today’s AKP dissociated
themselves in 2001. Despite its overtly traditional Islamist political stance, the
National View also embraces a nationalist outlook which, like the AKP,
designates Sunni-Muslim identity and the Ottoman legacy as core elements of the
20. Gökhan Çetinsaya, ‘Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of Turkish
Islamic Synthesis in Modern Turkish Political Thought’, The Muslim World, 89(3–4) (1999), pp. 362–363;
Ayşegül Aydıngün and İsmail Aydıngün, ‘The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity
and Turkishness’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10 (2004), p. 424; Mesut Yeğen, ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity in
Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40(6) (2004), p. 58; Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in
Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 15.
21. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, p. 48.
22. Hakan Yavuz, ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism’, Critique: Critical
Middle Eastern Studies, 7(12) (1998), p. 30.
23. Mustafa Şen, ‘Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of Justice and Development Party’, Turkish
Studies, 11(1) (2010), p. 61.
24. Çetinsaya, ‘Rethinking Nationalism and Islam’, p. 374.
NATIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE IN TURKEY
307
nation.25 The key difference in AKP’s position lies in its attempt to downplay anti-
capitalist and anti-western discourses associated with this traditional Islamist
perspective and to make it more compatible with the needs of the dominant
neoliberal economic vision.26 While it is true that AKP discourses depict the
Western world as a civilization in cultural crisis, this position does not lead it to
denounce or defy the world capitalist system itself. The National View, on the
other hand, argued from an Islamic Third Worldist perspective that the cutting of
ties with Western capitalism was one of the preconditions of fulfilling the national
interest and increasing the national wealth.27 The AKP, by contrast, has depicted
neoliberal strategies of growth as necessary to strengthen the position of the nation
in the international arena. This seemingly slight revision in fact leads to a
qualitative transformation in the ‘functions’ attributed to the nationalist
discourses, symbols and values by the National View. In AKP’s nationalism,
Islamic values and the Ottoman heritage are not brought to fore as a means of
delegitimizing, rejecting or challenging Western capitalism per se. Rather, as
İbrahim Kalın, the chief foreign policy advisor to Erdoğan makes clear in one of
his articles, these features of Turkey’s culture are conceived and introduced as
historical assets in its drive to become a regional leader and a respectable state
within existing global power relations.28
In its official political statements, the AKP, quite understandably, avoids
making direct references to Sunni Islam as the core element of nationhood.
However, one can easily infer the central role of Islam in AKP’s conception of
nation from its political practice as well as the discourse of its officials. In the AKP
period, the inclusion of elective Qur’an courses in the school curriculum has gone
hand in hand with controversial statements by Prime Minister Erdoğan, including
‘We will raise a religious generation’ or ‘We have four red lines: One state, one
nation, one flag, and one religion.’29
Nowhere is the centrality of Islam more evident than in the political strategy that
the AKP has used to deal with the longstanding Kurdish question in Turkey. As
opposed to the erstwhileKemalist official ideology that adopteda rigid assimilationist
policy of denying the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic identity, the AKP has
attempted to recognize the Kurdish presence in Turkey. This has revealed itself not
only in the statements of the AKP officials but also in such historical reforms as the
opening of an official state TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish. Nevertheless, this
‘recognition’ doesnotmean the acknowledgmentof theKurds as a separate nationper
sebut signifies a redefinitionof theKurds as anethnic or cultural component ofAKP’s
Muslim-oriented conception of ‘larger’ nation.30 What has made it possible for the
25. Berrin Koyuncuoğlu-Lorasdağı, ‘On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey: Sources and
Discourses’, in Ayşe Kadıoğlu and Fuat Keyman (eds.), Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in
Turkey (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2011), p. 146; Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and
Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 178.
26. Umut Bozkurt, ‘Neoliberalism with a Human Face: Making Sense of the Justice and Development Party’s
Neoliberal Populism in Turkey’, Science and Society, 77(3) (2013).
27. Lerna Yanık, ‘Constructing Turkish “Exceptionalism”: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold
War Turkish Foreign Policy’, Political Geography, 30 (2011), p. 86; Coşar, ‘Turkish Nationalism and Sunni
Islam’, p. 173.
28. İbrahim Kalın, ‘Debating Turkey in the Middle East: The Dawn of a New Geopolitical Imagination’, Insight
Turkey, 11(1) (2009), pp. 91–92.
29. Recep Tayip Erdoğan, 1 February 2012, Party Headquarters Meeting, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 4 May 2012,
AKP Adana Congress.
30. Burhanettin Duran, ‘Understanding the Ak Party’s Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and Its
Limitations’, Insight Turkey, 15(1) (2013), p. 94.
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AKP to present such amanoeuvre in state discourse is its distinctive understanding of
nation and nationalism. As long as the nation is defined along the lines of common
Muslim cultural values and a shared Ottoman history, the Kurds, as well as other
Muslim ethnic groups in Turkey, can be incorporated into the ‘nation.’ One of the
most explicit expressions of this Muslim vision of nation appeared in the AKP’s
election rally in June 2011, where Erdoğan devoted his whole speech to addressing
the common religious values that are supposed to unify Kurds and Turks under a
common national identity. The following excerpt from this speech presents a clear
expression of how the AKP combines its nationalist discourse with its recognition of
Kurdish identity.
Brothers, please look: Do they not all sleep in Çanakkale side by side? Turks, Kurds, Laz,
Arabs, Greeks—do they not sleep side by side? Do our martyrs not sleep side by side in
Sarıkamış? In Kut-al-Amara we achieved that victory together. We founded this republic
together . . . Diyarbakır, we are brothers. We are eternal brothers . . . Oh, brothers, the
community praying in Ulus Mosque turn towards the same Kıblah as the people in
Suleymaniye [Mosque] in Istanbul, in Selimiye [Mosque] in Edirne, and in Hacıbayram
[Mosque] in Ankara. See, we have the same Kıblah. [Is there] any separation? No!31
Erdoğan made a statement on similar lines during the historical visit to
Diyarbakır by the leader of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) of Northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani. In this speech, Erdoğan clearly reveals
what he means by ‘the nation’:
Rejection, denial, and assimilation have ended with our government. I can call a Turk a
Turk, a Kurd a Kurd, a Laz “my brother Laz.” We are one nation with all these differences.
Within this concept, within the concept of the nation, there are Turks, Kurds, Laz,
Circassians; one nation in its entirety. And, my brothers, this nation has one flag only. One
flag . . .We do not need other flags . . . I love all of you for the sake of God, not because you
are Turk, Kurd or Laz or this or that. I love you just because God, who created me, also
created you.32
This new formulation envisages an overarching national identity based on
Muslimhood that encompasses other ‘ethnicities’ as cultural components. Kurdish
ethnicity can reveal and exhibit itself as a separate culture as long as it is not used
to galvanize a claim for a separate Kurdish nationhood in Turkey that could
compete with and subvert the AKP’s Sunni-oriented conception of nation. The
AKP’s motto, ‘one nation, one state, and one flag,’ does not necessarily contradict
its recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity as long as ‘one nation’ is coupled with
the idea of ‘one religion’ as the most primary marker of what it means to be ‘the
nation’.33
31. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Diyarbakır Meeting, 1 June 2011.
32. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Diyarbakır Speech, 16 November 2013.
33. AKP’s conceptions of nation and nationalism, while resting on traditional elements of Turkish right, has
constantly evolved and gained substance in the process of facing domestic and international challenges to its
hegemonic project. Among these challenges were the secularist/Kemalist resistance within the state bureacracy
and army (early years), Kurdish opposition and dissidents of a deepening neoliberalism and authoritarianism
(later years). Therefore AKP’s nationalism is neither a longstanding but a dormant political position which found
a convenient ground with AKP coming to power nor a completely novel ideological composition that was solely
invented by the AKP. It is rather a still-evolving ideological project which has also some symbolic and ideational
roots in the traditional streams of Turkish right.
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The Geography of Nation and Foreign Policy
Ana Maria Alonso asserts that ‘the bounding of the nation as a collective subject,
as a superorganism with a unique biological-cultural essence replicates the
enclosure of national territory’.34 A nationalist project can only be persuasive in a
society to the extent that it represents the space of nationalist projects as the
homeland of nation.35
The notion of homeland, as the integral geographical component of any nation-
building process, is also a subject of ideological and political struggles and
susceptible to change depending on the course of these struggles. For this reason,
‘homeland’ should be treated as much a social and political artefact as ‘nation’.36
Geography, in accordance with this assertion, constitutes an integral element
of AKP’s new conception of nation. It is true that Islamic values and Muslim
identity that AKP presents as the backbone of ‘nation’ signifies and
encompasses a worldwide community much larger than the people living in
the Turkish national homeland. In AKP discourse, however, common Islamic
values are instrumentalized as a component of national identity only for people
living within the borders of Turkey without necessarily including the entire
Muslim world in the definition. The seemingly universalistic references to
‘Islamic civilization’ and an endorsement of the Sunni-Islamic political forces
such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt reveal the Islamist overtones in AKP’s
worldview. However, this should not mislead us to assume that AKP’s
imagination of nation is determined by an Islamist universalist perspective.
AKP’s hegemonic project and its nationalist discourse should not be seen as a
necessary extension of an overdetermining ummah-based Islamist cause. On the
contrary the degree to which universal Islamist values and Islamic civilization
occupies AKP’s political discourse is reliant upon its domestic nationalist
project. ‘Islamic world’ typically becomes a part of AKP’s political rhetoric
when highlighting the ‘historic mission’ of the nation, that is, acting as the
leader of former Ottoman territories as a ‘central country’. Therefore, AKP’s
emphasis on Islamic civilization could be seen as a part of the quest for
designating and highlighting the distinctive character of the nation (limited to
the borders of Turkey) in history and for building the national identity on a
social and historical basis different than that of Kemalism.
In several speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as also formulated in a more
academic language in Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth, AKP cadres tend to conceive
the existing nation-state structure and national borders as an artificial creation of
European colonial powers. In their perspective, throughout the twentieth century,
these official borders have been an obstacle to developing ‘intimate’ relations with
rest of the Islamic populations that share the same religious values and some
cultural traits as well as a common Ottoman past. Nevertheless, AKP officials and
intellectuals organically linked to this party have so far never proposed such a
radical project as collapsing these borders and ensuring the full political
unification of these societies. Rather, they presented the presupposed contradiction
between so called ‘geocultural’ integrity/ ‘historico-cultural affinities and legal
international borders as an advantage for Turkey in its involvement in
34. Alonso, ‘The Politics of Space, Time and Substance’, p. 384.
35. Ibid., p. 386.
36. Tolz, ‘Conflicting Homeland Myths and the Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia’, p. 268.
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neighbouring regions.37 In this respect, the declared goal of Turkish foreign policy
under the AKP is not to create an integrated Islamic world that completely rules
out the existing official borders but rather to ‘make territorial borders de facto
meaningless’ in order to increase the political effect of Turkey itself in the
region.38 In this respect, it can be argued that a universalist Islamist perspective
does not independently determine AKP’s ideology and its foreign policy but it
becomes a part of this party’s political discourse only in relation to its quest for
building a new nationalist hegemony within Turkey.
In this respect, despite its evident references to universal common Islamic
values, AKP’s conception of nation has a territorial delimitation. This territorial
specification enables the AKP to differentiate itself from a classical Islamist
political project that aims to unify the entire Sunni Muslim World, or ummah, as a
single and coherent political unit with particular interests. This does not mean,
however, that territories beyond Turkey are of no significance for the construction
of national identity. On the contrary, it is through the reformulation of the
relationship between the ‘region’ and the ‘homeland/nation’ that the AKP devises
its own conception of nation. AKP’s imagining the countries in its vicinity not as
separate nation-states but as former Ottoman territories is vital for its distinct
conception of national identity.
Erdoğan and other AKP officials occasionally mention the former Ottoman
lands stretching from the Arabic peninsula to the Balkans as territories ‘entrusted’
to Turkey.39 However, these places are not simply conceived as the original
homeland of ‘the nation.’ Rather, AKP’s foreign policy discourse asserts that ‘our
ancestors’ (ecdadımız) heroically appropriated and included these places within
the imperial borders but then unjustly lost them to the European powers. In this
understanding, which some authors refer to as ‘civilizational geopolitics,’ the
former Ottoman lands continue to reveal an embedded Ottoman spirit in their
social life and, most importantly, in their architecture.40 In this discourse,
ancestry/the nation did not spring from these places, but did leave an irreversible
and ineradicable mark in the cultural makeup and cognitive world of the people
living in these regions. In other words, the nation is constructed through
‘substantiating Turkey’s geographical location with a historical narrative’ that
exalts and eternalizes the Ottoman Empire’s influence over the territories it
ruled.41
Davutoğlu coins the term ‘tarihdaş’ (people sharing the same history) to refer to
the ties between the state/nation and the people living in the former Ottoman
territories. In his discourse, the active foreign policy of Turkey in the former
Ottoman lands means the fulfilment of the nation’s historical responsibility
towards its tarihdaş. In one speech to the Turkish parliament, Davutoğlu stated
that:
37. Bülent Aras, ‘Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Seta Policy Brief, (2009), p. 7.
38. Can Kasapoğlu, ‘The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Ege
Strategic Research Journal, 3(12) (2012), p. 3.
39. Yakup Pilch, Turkey’s Recent National Role Conceptions and Shifts in Its Foreign Policy (Unpublished MA
thesis, Central European University, 2012), p. 27.
40. Pınar Bilgin and Ali Bilgic, ‘Turkey’s “New” Foreign Policy toward Eurasia’, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 52(2) (2011), p. 190.
41. Kadri Kaan Renda, ‘Learning New Roles and Changing Beliefs: Turkish Strategic Culture in Transition’,
paper presented at UACES Student Forum Conference, University of Surrey, 30 June–01 July 2011, p. 16.
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All these lands, all these regions are our tarihdaş. As the state of the Turkish Republic we
are obliged to protect the rights of our citizens, as a nation preserving the past ties with our
tarihdaş is our historical mission. In this context, regardless of their ethnic and sectarian
origins, we are determined to embrace all of our tarihdaş and eliminate all the existing
barriers between us and our tarihdaş; this is why we are pursuing region-wide policies; this
is why we are establishing trilateral and multilateral mechanisms; and this is why we are in
pursuit of new initiatives within our bilateral relations.42
While people living in these neighbouring regions are not represented as a
natural part of ‘the nation,’ thanks to the deeply rooted cultural and socio-
psychological influence of the Ottoman culture, they are supposed to
wholeheartedly aspire to the strong presence of the Turkish state, the heir of the
Ottoman Empire, in their lands and see it as the ultimate solution to their
longstanding political problems.43 In other words, under the contemporary
conditions marked by modern nation-states with stable and internationally
recognized borders, these places are perceived as historically legitimate spheres of
interest for AKP’s nationalism rather than a true part of the national homeland.
One should note that this foreign policy vision leads to a striking change in the
perception of the original homeland; the territories under the authority of the
Turkish state today. While Kemalist nationalism construed Turkish territories
from a ‘defensive’ perspective as a homeland that had been liberated from and had
to be protected against the supposedly unending conspiracies of foreign and
domestic ‘enemies,’ AKP’s nationalism sees the same geography from a rather
more ambitious position; as a cultural and political ‘centre’ from which the
political influence of the Turkish state, as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, could be
extended into the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East.44 This perspective begets a
unique exceptionalist understanding that imagines Turkey neither as a ‘bridge’
connecting two continents as the conventional rhetoric on Turkey asserts, nor as a
frontier country, but rather as ‘a central country’.45 The following example of such
thinking is an excerpt from a speech Davutoğlu gave in Sarajevo on 16 October
2009:
Yes, whatever happens in the Balkans, Caucasus, or Middle East is our issue. Sitting in
Ankara, I drew a thousand-kilometer circle around my office. There are twenty-three
countries. All of them are our relatives and they expect something from us . . . Our foreign
policy aims to establish order in all these surrounding regions. For a Western or other
diplomat from another part of the world, a Bosnian issue is a technical issue to deal with,
like a technical process. For us, it is a life and death story . . . Like in the 16th century,
when the rise of the Ottoman Balkans was the center of world politics, we will make the
Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East together with Turkey the center of world politics in
the future. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve it.46
The ‘compass’ metaphor that Davutoğlu and his proponents in the media have
occasionally used to describe his foreign policy vision is reflective of this
distinctive perception of the relationship between nation and territory. The Turkish
state’s sphere of influence, this metaphor suggests, geographically encompasses
42. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol. 87, Session 37, 2011, p. 58, quoted in Renda, ‘Learning New Roles and
Changing Beliefs’, p. 16.
43. Aras and Görener, ‘National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation’, p. 83.
44. Ömer Taşpınar, ‘Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria’, Washington Quarterly, 35(3) (2012), p. 130.
45. Yanık, ‘Constructing Turkish “Exceptionalism’, p. 87.
46. Quoted in Demirtaş, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments’, pp. 236–237.
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those lands that fall within the circle drawn on a world map by a compass with its
needle centred on Anatolia. As such, AKP’s foreign policy discourse does not only
redefine and classify ‘other’ nations or peoples as tarihdaş, but it also reconstructs
‘the (our) nation’ through a new narrative of common history, a new
representation of the nation’s geography, and a new mission assigned to ‘the
nation’ in accordance with this geographical and historical vision. It should be
noted that the same ‘compass’ metaphor has also been used by some columnists
writing in conservative newspapers as well as Erdoğan and other AKP officials,
which exemplifies how the foreign policy discourse of the AKP could be
transferred to domestic political struggles.47
National History and Foreign Policy
The construction of a common national history, accompanied by the fashioning of
a common memory, is an integral element of any nationalist project, playing a
critical role in the naturalization of nationalist ideas and claims.48 A common
national history is important not only for building a sense of national belonging
and identity but also for legitimating nationalist projects and actions. The Sunni
basis of AKP’s conception of nation and nationalism can be most explicitly seen in
its tendency to address the Ottoman past as a shared history and an ‘epic past’ of
the members of the nation. This is also the most convenient vantage point from
which to see the qualitatively different ideational framework of AKP nationalism
as compared to Kemalism. Kemalist nationalism either addresses the foundation
of the Turkish Republic as the origin of the nation or traces this genesis all the way
back to ancient Anatolian civilizations. Yet, in no interpretation of Kemalist
nationalism can one see the Ottoman past as the primary marker of the ‘nation’.49
Rather, in Nora Fisher Onar’s words, ‘the persistent negation of Ottoman Islam
and Ottoman cosmopolitanism is echoed in Kemalists’ vision of Turkey’s role in
world affairs’.50 The contrary is the case for AKP nationalism in which the
‘nation’ is supposed to have reached its mature form in Ottoman times, and the
people living within the borders of Turkey are considered the descendants of the
Anatolian Muslims of the Ottoman period. The Ottomanist overtones of AKP
nationalism can be seen not only in the statements of AKP officials but also in
various areas of social life from the architecture of Turkey’s cities which now
feature many kitsch Ottoman symbols and structures to the tremendous increase in
books and novels exalting the Ottoman past as a golden age or lost paradise of the
nation.51
In the last 10 years of the AKP period, and especially during the foreign
ministry of Davutoğlu, foreign policy discourse and practice have played a critical
role in the process of redefining the nation along the lines of the Ottoman past.
As stated above, AKP officials and Davutoğlu in particular tend to justify the
recent unprecedentedly active role of the Turkish state in Middle Eastern conflicts
as a natural responsibility of a Turkish state which is the heir of the Ottoman
47. PM Erdoğan employed the same metaphor in his election rally in Konya on 3 June 2011.
48. Alonso, ‘The Politics of Space, Time and Substance’, p. 387.
49. Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 178.
50. Nora Fisher Onar, ‘Echoes of Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today’s Turkey’,
Middle Eastern Studies, 45(2) (2009), p. 233.
51. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, p. 8; Onar, ‘Echoes of Universalism Lost’, p. 235.
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Empire. In this discourse, the former Ottoman territories are proclaimed to be a
legitimate ‘sphere of influence’ where the Turkish state can bring a new Pax-
Ottomana, that is, the alleged ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ associated with a highly
romanticized view of Ottoman times. This indicates that foreign policy in the AKP
period has become also a critical ideological realm where this party’s own
nationalist vision has been produced and concretized.
Such romanticization of the imperial history is, to a certain extent, reminiscent
of ‘new-Right Eurasianism’ that appeared as an influential political line of
thinking in Russian politics throughout the 1990s. In the wake of a search for a
‘new national identity’ and a ‘new foreign policy vision’ in Russia after the demise
of the Soviet Union, Alexander Dugin, the most prominent figure of the new
Eurasianist perspective, had initiated the idea that Russia, as the heir of a
continental Empire, has the legitimate right to resecure control over Eurasia.52
This legitimacy, according to Dugin, springs from the ‘unique’ role that Russia
had played in history, as a ‘benevolent Empire that respected difference, and in
which the spread and promotion of the Orthodox faith did not under- mine cultural
co-existence as claimed by Western historians and geopoliticians.’53 Despite
sharing a similar tendency of deriving a new geopolitical strategy and national
identity from a romanticized view of imperial history, we should note that the
new-Right Eurasianism qualitatively diverges from neo-Ottomanism in its explicit
defiance of the US hegemony and ‘Atlanticism’ in world politics, which has never
been a central theme in AKP’s nationalist discourse and in its foreign policy
orientation.
The ideational roots of an Ottomanist conception of nation can be found in
Davutoğlu’s well-known book Strategic Depth, written one year before the AKP
came to power. This book engages in a kind of theoretical discussion of the ideal
foreign policy strategy that Turkish state needs to adopt in the post September 11
period. Davutoğlu conceives the Ottoman past as the core cultural essence of the
nation and criticizes the Kemalist period and its foreign policy for repressing and
consciously disregarding this essence. From Davutoğlu’s perspective, this
essence, submerged but still deeply ingrained in the make-up of nation, represents
an unrealized potential; one that could make the Turkish state an influential actor
in world politics if it is seen as the basis of a general foreign policy strategy.
Davutoğlu combines this essentialist and culturalist logic with an uncanny
idealism when he describes the Ottoman legacy as an independent historical force
which unavoidably imposes its own ‘will’ on daily politics, which, again, evokes
anti-rationalist overtones in Dubin’s Eurasianism54:
This situation is nothing but the weight of the element of history as one significant
parameter of power making itself felt. Turkey, which has been seen as the inheritor of 700
years of Ottoman history, is still seen as a political center by the people in its close
territorial basin. The Ottoman remainder in Turkey’s close territorial basin make these
groups see Turkey as the power to protect them in their original land or as a place of refuge
in case of a possible attempt at abolition. This leads Turkey to come face to face with new
regional missions oriented by the parameter of history. This is nothing but an expression
52. Alexander Dugin, Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım (Küre: İstanbul, 2010).
53. Graham Smith, ‘The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism’, Royal
Geographical Society, 24(4) (1999), p. 484.
54. Alan Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugfin: Geopolitics and Neo-fascism in Post-soviet Russia’, Political Geography,
20 (2001), p. 1033.
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of the fact that history exceeds the wills limited to particular periods and exerts its
authority over daily politics.55
From Davutoğlu’s perspective, one of the preconditions for this foreign policy
strategy to be successful is to eradicate the ‘alienation’ or ‘dementia’ (benlik
bölünmesi) that Turkish society and politicians have suffered from for the last
hundred years as a result of the top-down modernization process.56 The Kemalist
modernization project created, from this perspective, a discrepancy between the
existing profile of the society and its cultural/civilizational essence. This
discrepancy also posed an obstacle to the harmony between a foreign policy
shaped by the historical (Ottomanist) strategic mentality and the people/society as
a potential force to be used as a parameter of power.57 As such, the realization of
‘strategic depth’ (the ideal foreign policy strategy) entails a societal
transformation that would ensure the full development of a ‘sense of social
belonging constructed upon a strong historical socio-cultural basis’.58 This could
be only achieved by an active and strong state able to ‘reach the depths of the
nation and ensure spiritual unity based on the common value system lying in these
depths’.59 Davutoğlu’s foreign policy strategy thus also includes the idea of
societal transformation or social engineering via state power and hence a quest for
political hegemony.
National Interest and Foreign Policy
Nationalism rests on a particular conception of historic national interests. The
specificity of AKP nationalism can also be seen in this party’s distinct formulation
of where the nation’s interests lie. As the nation’s identity is reconstructed with
reference to the Ottoman past, the national interest is defined as becoming a ‘great
nation’ or creating as grand and powerful a country as the Ottoman Empire. This
redefinition of national interest goes hand in hand with a critique of an earlier—
supposedly Kemalist—conception of foreign policy which, according to this
perspective, tended to isolate itself from the Middle East because of its obsessive
antipathy towards Islam. Kemalist foreign policy, in this discourse, has been
accused of adopting an unnecessarily passive stance vis-á-vis world affairs and
failing to make use of the potential stemming from its history, geography, and
culture. Davutoğlu’s recent statements reveal how AKP officials perceive the
historic mission of the Turkish state:
The other states say to us, ‘do not engage in adventures in foreign policy, do not follow an
active politics.’ And we keep saying ‘Turkey has always been a subject, can never be
objectified. We have always been a subject, and no one can make this nation an object.
Today, could anyone, particularly Palestine, oppose anything in the Middle East without
the presence of Turkey? We should do what our history necessitates. This nation has
always been a subject of history and will continue to be so.60
Here again, Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth is illuminating for understanding the
ideational foundations of this conception of national interest. Davutoğlu claims
55. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 143.
56. Ibid., p. 59.
57. Ibid., p. 36.
58. Ibid., p. 96.
59. Ibid., p. 37.
60. İhlas News Agency, 3 March 2013.
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that every nation inherits from history a ‘geo-cultural and geopolitical basin’, i.e. a
sphere of hegemonic influence, which may transcend and conflict with its existing
legal borders. Nations, and especially those with imperial history, naturally seek to
go beyond their national borders and claim activity in their historically determined
spheres of influence.61 As such, Turkey, with its imperial history, should devise a
rational-strategic plan employing methods of infiltration into its own historically
determined basin. National interest could be achieved insofar as Turkey
successfully puts into practice effective strategies to maximize its influence in
these regions.
Domestic and International Limits of AKP’s Nationalism
With its emphasis on Sunni-Islam and Ottoman history, the AKP vision of the
nation and its brand of nationalism cannot fail to categorically exclude large
sections of society in such a country as Turkey where a great many people do not
share Islamic religious values as guiding principles for their lives or identities. Not
only does the (originally Shia) Alevi population make up almost 15 per cent of
society, but those who have internalized a secularist worldview have, from the
outset, also shown an explicit skepticism if not antagonism to the AKP nationalist
project.62 The AKP response to this overt exclusion of certain segments of society
has been to rigidify its Islamic conservative nationalist discourse. Especially after
the elections in 2011, during which the AKP proved its electoral power, the party
has tended to dismiss dissident voices by resorting to the discourse of ‘national
will’ as revealed in the ballots, which, according to party officials, has authorized
the government’s exercise of an unfettered executive power.
This dismissive and on occasion intimidating attitude towards the groups who
do not belong in AKP’s new national project suggests the concept of ‘two-nations
hegemony’. Bob Jessop et al. use this concept to characterize the ideological and
political strategies that Margaret Thatcher utilized throughout the 1980s to create
the appropriate conditions for the turn to a neoliberal accumulation strategy. For
them, Thatcherism represented a rupture with traditional British politics which
attempted to integrate ‘the poor, deprived, and underprivileged into membership
of the community’ into ‘one nation’ through certain economic and ideological
strategies.63 In contrast, Thatcherism explicitly excluded the various pauper
classes from the idea of the nation and presented ‘an image of social divisions
based on a single, vertical cleavage stretching from top to bottom of society
[opposing] the productive to the parasitic’.64 In the context of a deepening
neoliberalism in Britain, the underlying objective of this ‘two-nations’ project,
was to increase the productivity of labour-power and ensure the ‘consent’ of the
working class employed in ‘productive’ sectors for the Thatcherite transformation
by juxtaposing them with the so called ‘unproductive’ segments of society; that is,
groups dependent on state subsidies.
As a new form of hegemonic project in Turkey, AKP nationalism resembles this
two-nations strategy in terms of consciously pushing certain segments of society
61. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 20–21.
62. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, p. 12.
63. Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley, and Tom Ling, Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1988), p. 87.
64. Ibid., p. 88.
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out of the scope of a nation defined by its conservative Islamic values.
Nevertheless, unlike Thatcherism, the line of division between the two nations in
the current AKP discourse is cultural rather than economic. Recent AKP discourse
has constructed national boundaries on the basis of Islamic-conservative values,
which are now given the status of ‘national values.’ As shown throughout this
paper, the foreign policy discourse and practice of the AKP has been consonant
with this two-nations strategy and contributed to its further solidification in
Turkish politics.
This exclusionary hegemonic strategy has enabled the AKP government to
address dissident sections of society as domestic ‘foes’ and an internal hindrance
to the realization of the national will and the achievement of national
development. Through this two-nations strategy, the AKP has juxtaposed its
electoral supporters to those sections of society falling outside its definition of
nation, crafted an idiosyncratic political identity for itself, legitimized its attempts
to assert its power, and thereby consolidated its own popular base.
This strategy, which seemed to work well thanks to the series of sweeping AKP
electoral victories, faced a grave crisis in June 2013 when popular discontent with
its exclusionary strategies led to an outburst of rage against the government during
what is known as the ‘Gezi Protests’. The protests started as a reaction to the
government’s attempt to build a shopping mall on Gezi Park, one of the few public
parks in downtown Istanbul, and immediately faced extreme police violence. The
repressive tactics did nothing but turn the protests into country-wide
demonstrations against the AKP government. From the slogans, demands, and
concerns raised during the protests, one could see that the Gezi resistance
encompassed and mobilized the very people excluded from AKP’s definition of
nation; a loose bloc of secularists, anti-capitalists, Alevis, youth, and women
disturbed by the government’s Islamic conservative practices and discourses. The
emergence of such a bloc and its categorical rejection of AKP policies provoked
an ideological crisis for the AKP, as it became evident that those excluded from its
Sunni-based conservative conception of the nation could emerge as a counter-
hegemonic political dynamic that could defy and subvert it. It is obvious that, after
the Gezi protests, it has become more difficult than ever for the AKP to claim to
represent the entire nation or devise ambitious domestic and foreign policy
strategies in the name of its interests.
There is an intricate connection between AKP’s nationalist hegemonic project
at the domestic level and its foreign policy in the international context, and a crisis
on one front necessarily instigates a crisis on the other. As of 2014, it can be
observed that the AKP has been suffering deep setbacks not only in its domestic
politics but also in foreign policy. Although, the AKP government attempted to
play an intrusive role and pursue ambitious foreign policy goals after the initial
Arab uprisings in 2011, it started to experience serious challenges in the face of
changing political balances in the Middle East. The AKP interpreted the electoral
victory of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as the emergence of a new strategic
partner in Middle East that could facilitate Turkey’s political and ideological
impact in the region. However, the coup of 3 July 2013 and the consequent
removal of Mohammed Mursi from power dashed the raised hopes of AKP
government. AKP’s insistent anti-coup stance in the aftermath of the removal of
Mursi was not shared by many countries in the region as well as leading
international powers that took rather a much more circumspect attitude towards
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the new Egyptian regime represented by General Abdelfattah al-Sissi. Another
significant challenge appeared in Syria where the AKP government has openly
supported the Free Syrian Army and some radical Islamist opposition groups
against the Bashar Al Assad in order to take initiative and have a say in the new
political climate that was supposed to appear after the expected fall of Baas
regime. As the Sunni-oriented opposition groups could not succeed in
overthrowing Assad Regime, radical Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations
took the upper hand in the war, and consequently the Syrian revolt took the
character of a civil war reaching a stalemate as of 2013. When, even under these
circumstances the AKP government continued to give unconditional support to
opposition forces, its foreign policy strategy led to scepticism on part of USA and
its allies in the region, i.e. Saudi Arabia, which tended to support opposition rather
in a more strategic and cautious manner. The emergence of a de-facto Kurdish
entity in Northern Syria in the midst of the conflict was another complication
facing AKP’s Syrian policy. Under the leadership of the PKK-affiliated
Democratic Union Party (PYD), this new Kurdish entity not only posed an
obstacle to AKP’s ambition to significantly expand its sphere of influence in Syria
but also added some new regional dynamics to the Kurdish question in Turkey’s
domestic politics.
Conclusion
The new foreign policy orientation and official foreign policy discourse adopted
during the AKP period in the last decade have been a crucial component and
instrument of building a new nationalist hegemonic project in Turkey. Through a
neo-Ottomanist foreign policy outlook AKP has attempted to reconstruct the
conception of nation in Turkey and redefine the notions of national history,
national homeland and national interest. The roots of the connection between this
new vision of nationalism and foreign policy can be found in the discourses that
AKP officials deployed in domestic and international politics, which has been
highly inspired by the perspective of incumbent minister of foreign affairs Ahmet
Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu’s well-known book, Strategic Depth, provide us with the
intellectual and ideological underpinnings of this new perspective and new
hegemonic project.
Despite the fact that AKP government has taken ‘bold’ steps in both
international and domestic arena to crystallize this new neo-Ottomanist vision of
nationalism, they have recently faced some grave political challenges in sustaining
and substantiating its hegemonic project. The wave of anti-government protests
during the Gezi Uprising in June 2013 that mobilized millions of Turkish citizens
all across Turkey indicated the fragility and vulnerability of this new hegemonic
project through undermining and invalidating the legitimacy of AKP’s new vision
of nation. The recent unsettling developments in the Middle Eastern politics that
changed the balances of power in the region seriously have been another dynamic
that obstructed the sustainability of AKP’s new foreign policy orientation and
discourse.
Such overt discrepancy between AKP’s neo-Ottomanist discourse and the
predicaments occurring in its foreign policy discourse practice would normally put
some limits in the party’s use of foreign policy for the purpose of consolidating its
nationalist project and hegemony in domestic politics. While the government is
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still seeking to downplay and avert the repercussions of the Gezi protests at the
domestic level, it is also trying to cope with the gradual collapse of its foreign
policy vision in the Middle East. In the context of these unstable political
conditions, AKP’s nationalist project and its neo-Ottomanist manifestations in
foreign policy seem to be heading towards a deepening crisis.
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